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This chapter considers the role money plays in the economy. At present, there 
is  considerable disagreement among economists over the role of  money in 
economic fluctuations. On the one hand, monetarists (Friedman 1968; Lucas 
1972, 1977) consider unanticipated changes in the money supply exogenously 
caused by central banks to be the major shock driving economic fluctuations. 
On the other hand, real business cycle theorists argue that macroeconomic 
fluctuations are set off  by technological shocks such as changes in total factor 
productivity, and that the propagation of these shocks through the economy is 
due to nonmonetary factors such as optimal consumption smoothing by indi- 
viduals and lags in the construction of new capital. According to this theory, 
therefore, money does not play a major role either as a shock or as a propaga- 
tion mechanism: money is nothing but a veil (King and Plosser 1984; Plosser 
1990). Between  these two polar views, Keynesians hold that both real de- 
mand and monetary shocks are important in business cycles. Yoshikawa and 
Ohtake (1987) argue that neither rational-expectations-based monetarism nor 
real business cycle theory can reasonably explain postwar business cycles in 
Japan, arguing instead that real demand shocks played the major role. This 
chapter focuses on money and considers its role in economic fluctuations. 
To make progress toward fully understanding the role money plays in the 
economy, it is essential to grasp precisely how monetary policy is conducted. 
Irrespective  of  the views  expressed by their authors, most macroeconomic 
analyses, both theoretical and empirical, assume either that the money supply 
is exogenous or that very simple feedback rules guide monetary policy. These 
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simplifying assumptions make feasible the calculations of equilibrium that are 
consistent with rational expectations,  but it is rarely questioned whether the 
assumptions made are a good approximation to how monetary policy is con- 
ducted in the real world. 
This chapter argues that the money supply very often becomes endogenous, 
passively  reflecting various shocks to the economy. The basic reason money 
becomes endogenous is that central banks smooth the nominal interest rate. 
Occasionally,  however, central banks do change the money supply indepen- 
dently or exogenously, thus affecting the real economy (“dynamic operations” 
in  Roosa’s  (1956) terminology).  Monetary  policy,  therefore,  follows  time- 
varying nominal interest rate smoothing, and consists of a regime somewhere 
between the two polar cases of interest rate pegging and dynamic operations. 
Section  5.1 demonstrates  the  endogeneity  of  the  money  supply  using  a 
simple model.  To shed light on the role of money in economic fluctuations, 
section 5.2 analyzes  monetary  policy  in  seasonal  fluctuations.  Section 5.3 
studies monetary policy at business cycle frequencies and shows that the nom- 
inal interest rate is indeed very often smoothed. This section also analyzes the 
proximate targets the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has pursued in its policymaking. 
Section  5.4 analyzes  the transmission  mechanism of  monetary  policy.  The 
experiences  of Japan over a thirty-year period  are examined and then com- 
pared  with  those  of  the  United  States.  Not  surprisingly,  the  transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy is found to differ substantially over time and 
also across countries. Section 5.5 offers concluding remarks. 
5.1  Nominal Interest Smoothing and Endogenous Money Supply 
Monetarists take changes in the money supply to be exogenous. As will be 
observed below, however, this is not a good description of observed changes 
in the money supply because the BOJ very often smooths the nominal interest 
rate. Of course, another issue is whether nominal interest smoothing is a de- 
sirable policy, but in fact such policies have been adopted by the BOJ. When 
the BOJ  smoothes the nominal interest rate,  specifically, the call rate in the 
case of  Japan,  the money supply must endogenously change in response to 
real disturbances.  In this case, changes in the money supply become nothing 
but mirror images of real shocks. 
Keeping  this point in mind, I first consider the relationship between the 
money supply and the real economy in a simple macroeconomic model. This 
model will form a basis for the discussion in subsequent sections. 
Although the basic points I want to make in sections 5.3 and 5.4 are not 
model-specific,  to  facilitate  explanation  I  consider  a  simple  Taylor-type 
macroeconomic model (Taylor 1979, 1980). The model consists of five equa- 





Y, = -a[i, -  E(P,+,  1 a,)  + P,] + c,, 
w,  = CLW,.,  I a,-,>  + (1 -  (Y)P,_, + q,, 
M, -  P, = Y, -  pi, + G,,  p > 0; 
a > 0; 
0 < a  < 1; 
M, = d(i, -  i,*)  + 6,  . 
Y is real GNP, P is the price level, W is nominal wages, and M is the nominal 
money supply; all are measured in logs. E(x I a)  denotes taking the expected 
value of x  conditional on the information set a.  C,  q,  G, and 6 are disturbances 
in each equation. 
The BOJ is assumed to smooth the nominal interest rate i around the target 
rate  i*.  The extent of  nominal  interest rate  smoothing  is expressed by  the 
parameter d in (5). When d becomes large, the nominal interest rate is virtu- 
ally pegged. On the other hand, when d is zero, the money supply is equal to 
the disturbance  E, which is supposed to reflect changes in the BOJ’s policy 
stance, and in this case the nominal rate  i becomes an endogenous variable. 
Note that this characterization of the BOJ’s behavior implicitly  assumes that 
the  BOJ  systematically  reacts  to income, price,  or money demand  shocks 
within the period.  In fact, the analysis of the seasonal cycle below suggests 
that the BOJ systematically reacts to various shocks with a lag of less than one 
month. 
The model is otherwise standard and needs no explanation.  Output  Y,  the 
price level 8  the money supply M,  and the nominal interest rate i in this model 
are determined as follows (for simplicity, i*  is taken to be zero): 
1 
A 
Y, = -  [ya(@ - bc)P,-, -  yabq, 
PA  + {-  + (y + 1) (b - l)a>6, + (y +  1)41; 
d 
1. McCallum (1983) argues that in vector autoregression systems, monetary policy surprises 
may be more accurately represented by interest rate than by money stock innovations if the mon- 
etary authority aims to hit a money supply target but uses an interest rate instrument. His analysis, 
however, rests on the assumption that the monetary authority does not systematically react to 




b=l+-  b > 1; and 
c  = a+* + (1 - a),  0 < c < 1; 
and + (0 < + < 1) is a root of the following characteristic equation of  the 
system: 
U  ab  + ya]x2  - [  + Y]* 
(10)  = [((b - l)a +  1)  ((b - 1)a +  1) 
+ y(l - a)  = 0. 
The basic message is that in general changes in the money supply M,  con- 
tain various shocks: price shocks q,  real demand shocks u, portfolio shocks v, 
and changes in the BOJ’s policy stance E. Monetarism takes it for granted that 
the E’S are by far the most dominant shocks. 
Before I proceed to the empirical analysis, I will consider some special but 
important cases of the solutions (6)-(9). 
When ‘the BOJ smooths the nominal interest rate to a considerable degree 
(d +  w),  we obtain 
(1 1) 
1 
M, =  ~  [MY  + a) + (Y + l)a(+2 - c))P,-, 
(13)  (Y + a) 
+ y(1 -  a>.?, + (y + a)+, + (y + l)fi,l, 
and 
(14)  i,  = i*. 
Real output Y and the price level P become independent of portfolio shocks 
Under the same assumption that d is large, if we further assume that the 
v,  whereas the money supply responds to 5 one for one. 




If  a, the interest elasticity of aggregate demand, is small, output is virtually 
determined by  the real  demand shock  u. On  the other hand,  real demand 
shocks do not affect price. Price is affected only by the price shock -q. 
We next consider the other extreme case, in which the BOJ does not attempt 
to smooth the nominal interest rate (d = 0). In this case, we obtain 
PI = cP,-,  + q,, 
MI = {c + a(+2 - c)}P,-, + (1 -  a)fl + v + fir. 
+ y(1 -  a)?, + (y + a>v, - (y + uF, + (y + 1)41, 
where A’ = y(1 + a@) + a@ + a and b’  = 1 + UP. Output is affected by 
E, the independent change in the money supply. This corresponds to Roosa’s 
(1956) “dynamic” operations. 
With different degrees of interest rate smoothing d, observed changes in the 
money supply either passively reflect various shocks to the economy (13) or 
embody exogenous changes in the BOJ’s policy stance (20). The relative im- 
portance of the exogenous component E in the variance of  money supply M, 
a;/u2,, is 
PA  [-  + (y +  1) (b - I)al2a: 
d 
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$/a; approaches  1 or 0 as d vanishes or becomes infinite, respectively. With 
these results,  I turn  to the empirical analysis,  in which  monetary policy  in 
both the seasonal and the business cycles is examined. 
5.2  Money Supply and the Seasonal Cycle 
Although  seasonal cycles have long been recognized,  until  very recently 
most research on macroeconomic fluctuations used seasonally adjusted data, 
treating seasonal fluctuations as unworthy of study. It was against this current 
of  research  that Barsky  and  Miron  (1989) and  Yoshikawa (1989) began to 
study seasonal cycles in the United States and in Japan, respectively, Although 
the main interest here is the role of money in business cycles, much informa- 
tion can be obtained by studying seasonal cycles. 
Fluctuations of monthly  real output (in the index of  industrial  production 
[IIP] compiled by MITI) and of  the money supply (M,  + CD) in Japan are 
shown in figure 5.1 (in rates of change relative to the previous month). They 
are highly periodic and regular. This initial impression is confirmed by exam- 
ining the spectrum of these variables (figs. 5.2 and 5.3): real output and the 
money supply indeed show very similar patterns of  seasonal fluctuation. The 
peaks and troughs of the deterministic seasonality of the two variables, how- 
ever, do not exactly coincide (table 5.1)., The rate of  change in the money 
supply peaks  in  December,  is high in March and June,  and bottoms out in 
January and February.  On the other hand, the rate of  change in IIP peaks in 
March, is high in September, bottoms out in January, and is low in August, 
April, and May. This difference  in the timing of  fluctuations  is most  likely 
due to tho facts: (1) industrial production is not equal to expenditures,  and 
(2)  there is a lag between production and other transactions on the one hand 
and payments on the other.3 The money supply usually increases in December 
because consumption and custom payments such as interfirm settlements and 
wages peak during that month. 
2. The seasonality measures shown in table 5.1 are the deferministic seasonality captured by 
twelve monthly dummies. The estimated coefficient for each monthly dummy can be interpreted 
as the average rate of  change in each month. A tacit assumption is that the variance of the errors 
around the average is the same from January to December. Although stochastic seasonality exists, 
Barsky and Miron (1989) report that deterministic seasonality is quantitatively much more impor- 
tant than stochastic seasonality in the majority of the economic variables they examined. 
3. Take the example of investment. Construction would take a year or two, and a typical pay- 
ment pattern is that a quarter is paid when construction starts, another quarter in the middle, and 
the remaining half at the time of  completion. Similarly, in the case of machinery, there is, first of 
all, a three-to-six-month  lag between  order and  shipment.  Payment is then made three to  six 
months after delivery. Finally, if payment is made by  a three-to-six-month bill, the lag between 
orders and final settlements can be at longest a year and a half. An additional point to be noted in 
the case of Japan is that, by custom, interfirm settlements are made at the end of  March, Septem- 
ber, or December. 
So far the discussion has concerned payment made by firms that order investment goods. When 
firms that produce investment goods take orders and start production, it soon becomes necessary 
for them to pay for labor and raw materials. The lags for these payments are much shorter than 
those for investment orders. 127  Monetary Policy and the Real Economy in Japan 
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Fig. 5.1  Money and production 
For reference,  the deterministic  seasonality in other variables is shown in 
tables 5.2 and  5.3. It is observed,  for example, that consumption peaks in 
December and is high in March, whereas investment peaks in March and Sep- 
tember. On the other hand, consumption bottoms out in January, and invest- 
ment  bottoms  out  in  January,  April, and  October.  In  passing,  the  seasonal 
fluctuations  in consumption, measured by the coefficient of  variation (31.7), 
are  smaller than  those  in  machinery  orders  (71.3) but larger than  those in 
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Fig. 5.3  Spectrum of index of industrial production 
payments peak in December and June, a consequence of the celebrated bonus 
system. 
Aside from a peak in consumption in December, therefore, production and 
expenditures tend to move  concurrently over the  seasonal cycle: they  both 
increase  in June and September and decrease in Jan~ary.~  A comparison of 
indices  of  production,  shipments, and  inventory  stocks (table 5.3) in  fact 
4. Indices of industrial production in all industries except for food peak in March and Septem- 
ber. Production in the food industry peaks in December. 129  Monetary Policy and the Real Economy in Japan 
Table 5.1  The Deterministic Seasonality of Money and Output 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Mean  S.D. 
(X  10)  (X  10)  (2)/(1)  S.E.  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May 
IIP  0.05  0.62  12.40  0.18  -1.20  0.66  0.90  -0.41  -0.24 
(-30.29)  (17.08)  (23.32)  (-10.63)  (-6.26) 
M2  +  0.10  0.13  1.30  0.06  -0.04  -0.07  0.18  0.12  0.06 
CD  (-3.43)  (-5.45)  (14.66)  (10.21)  (4.57) 
Jun  Jul  Aug  SeP  oc  t  Nov  Dec  Sample 
0.46  0.08  -0.68  0.81  -0.05  -0.02  0.25  67.2 
0.18  0.12  0.04  0.10  0 01  0. I3  0.39  67.2 
(11.89)  (2.11)  (-17.68)  (21.12)  (-1.21)  (-0.63)  (6.43)  -87.12 
(14.77)  (9.71)  (3.44)  (8.56)  (1.23)  (10.99)  (32.46)  -88.  I 
Note: f = values in parentheses. 
Table 5.2  The Deterministic Seasonality of Household Income and Consumption 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Mean  S.D. 
(x  10)  (x  10)  (2)/(1)  S.E.  Jan  Fe  b  Mar  Apr  May 
Household  0.07  4.44  63.43  0.30  -10.17  0.12  1.37  -0.72  0.03 
income  (- 155.54)  (0.89)  (21.01)  (- 10.98)  (0.52) 
Consumption  0.06  1.90  31.67  0.24  -4.13  -0.58  1.99  -0.44  -0.48 
(-73.93)  (-10.02)  (34.71)  (-7.65)  (-8.39) 
~ 
Jun  Jul  Aug  SeP  Oct  Nov  Dec  Sample 
4.81  -  0.89  -2.92  -0.87  0.18  0.13  9.80  67.2 
0.26  0.75  -0.46  -0.75  0.59  -0.19  4.19  69.10 
(73.57)  (- 13.59)  (-44.64)  (- 13.34)  (2.73)  (1.97)  (149.83)  -88.1 
(4.52)  (13.07)  (-8.00)  (-13.08)  (10.63)  (-3.38)  (74.99)  -88.  I 
Note: f  = values in parentheses 
shows that  there is little production  smoothing.  The variance  of  shipments 
(0.76) is slightly greater than that of production (0.62), but the difference is 
rather marginal. As a result, seasonal fluctuation in inventory stocks is small. 
Substantial  production  smoothing  is  observed  only  in  December:  the  high 
consumption in December is met by a decumulation of inventory stocks. The 
fact that production and expenditures broadly  move together contradicts the 
notion of an increasing short-run marginal cost curve and suggests a flat mar- 
ginal cost curve. This case is also strengthened by the fact that seasonal fluc- 
tuations in expenditures are largely anticipated by producers. 
Aside from timing, money and real output show very similar seasonal fluc- 
tuations.  As noted  at the beginning of  this  chapter,  it is a matter  of  much 
dispute whether the high correlation between money and real output over the 130  Hiroshi Yoshikawa 
Table 5.3  The Deterministic  Seasonality of Investment 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Mean  S.D. 
(X  10)  (X  10)  (2)1(1)  S.E.  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May 
Orders of  0.04  2.85  71.25  1.21  -2.90  1.34  4.80  -3.78  -0.40 
machinery  (-10.48)  (4.71)  (16.89)  (-13.29)  (-1.43) 
Shipment of  0.08  1.27  15.88  0.43  -1.28  1.14  2.32  -1.77  -0.55 
capital goods  (- 13.26)  (12.13)  (24.68)  (- 18.84)  (-5.80) 
Jun  Jul  Aug  SeP  Oct  Nov  Dec  Sample 
0.81  -0.92  -0.08  4.18  -3.50  -0.58  1.61  69.5 
(2.94)  (-3.32)  (-0.28)  (15.11)  (-12.67)  (-2.11)  (5.81)  -88.  I 
0.69  0.06  -0.27  1.63  -  1.39  -0.17  0.46  67.2 
(7.30)  (0.69)  (-2.89)  (17.32)  (-14.79)  (-1.86)  (4.87)  -87.12 
Note: r  = values in parentheses 
business cycle reflects a causal mechanism running from money to output or 
the other way around. In contrast to the case of business cycles, however, it is 
absurd to argue that seasonal fluctuations in real activities are caused by sim- 
ilar fluctuations in money: they clearly reflect real factors such as weather or 
customs (for example, New Year’s Day in Japan or Christmas in the United 
States). In other words, there is an “identifying restriction” that fluctuations 
in real output are independent of money in the case of seasonal cycles. 
It is theoretically  possible, in the context of  models  in which agents are 
solving ‘intertemporal optimization problems, that seasonal power in output is 
due in part to a white-noise monetary shock. This possible effect is not very 
important, however, because real variables such as outputs in various indus- 
tries, consumption, and investment have similar spectral patterns but different 
seasonal patterns of peaks and troughs (tables 5.1-5.3).  To  the extent that (as 
a first approximation) all the agents are subject to the same monetary shocks, 
it is difficult to understand that optimum responses of the agents to a common 
monetary shock produce changes in real variables which have similar spectral 
patterns but at the same time different seasonal patterns of peaks and troughs. 
It is more reasonable to consider that tastes and technology show their own 
idiosyncratic  seasonal  fluctuations,  which  are conditioned  by  weather  and 
custom. Therefore, I argue that the “identifying restriction” that fluctuations 
in real variables are independent of money in the case of seasonal cycles is, if 
not definite, at least quite reasonable. 
The reason  money  fluctuates similarly to real variables is that the money 
supply responds endogenously to seasonal fluctuations in real activities. If the 
money supply did not  respond  endogenously to seasonal real  shocks, then 
interest rates would show seasonal fluctuations. In fact, the BOJ intentionally 131  Monetary Policy and the Real Economy in Japan 
responds to real shocks in order to smooth the nominal interest rate.5 It can be 
observed that changes in the money supply broadly coincide with changes in 
high-powered money and BOJ lending rather than with changes in the reserve 
ratio or the currency/deposit ratio (table 5.4). They all peak in December and 
are high in March and June, bottoming out in January and February. 
Cash moves slightly differently  from money. It peaks in December but is 
also high in July. The high in July coincides with high consumption and con- 
firms that cash is used mostly by consumers rather than by firms. As a digres- 
sion, it would be interesting to examine the other component of money-bank 
deposits-as  well. As of December  1988 cash amounted to only 31.5 billion 
yen of M,  + CD, which totaled 409.3 billion yen. Demand deposits and time 
deposits were 80.3 and 297.5 billion  yen, respectively. Table 5.4 shows the 
seasonal cycles  of the demand  and  time deposits of individuals  and  firms. 
Time deposits do not exhibit any clear seasonal movements, but demand de- 
posits do. Demand deposits  of  individuals and  firms,  however,  show quite 
different seasonal patterns.  For individuals,  they  are high in the second and 
fourth quarters. Evidently  they  reflect bonus payments  (table 5.2). In con- 
trast, the demand deposits of firms peak in the third quarter and reach a trough 
in the second quarter. This seasonal pattern is broadly consistent with that of 
production. 
Coming back to the main argument, we see that as a result of  the BOJ’s 
actions  seasonal  fluctuations  in  the  nominal  interest  rate  are  substantially 
weakened. Indeed, the spectrum of the call rate does not show any significant 
seasonality (figure 5.4). 
Interest  rate  smoothing  or  money  supply  accommodation  would  make 
changes in real output greater than otherwise, which is not a fault of  this pol- 
icy in the case of the seasonal cycle, since seasonal fluctuations of real activi- 
ties are mostly desirable. As argued above, agents’ intertemporal optimization 
that produces smoothing of consumption or production makes much less sense 
over the seasonal cycle than over the business cycle or the life cycle of  an 
individual. Tastes and technology,  which are usually taken as stable in inter- 
temporal optimization models, fluctuate during the seasonal cycle. As the ex- 
ample of  a fall in construction activities during the rainy season shows, sea- 
sonal fluctuations in real activities are mostly desirable. Seasonal fluctuations 
in interest rates, on the other hand, can be a disturbance to the real economy. 
Miron (1986), for example, argues that in the United States prior to the foun- 
dation of the Fed in  1914, seasonal fluctuations  in the nominal  interest rate 
often created financial panic, whereas the number of financial panics substan- 
tially decreased after 1914 when the Fed started smoothing the nominal inter- 
5. In the United States, the Federal Reserve also smooths the nominal interest rate at seasonal 
frequencies. Indeed, one of the major objectives of the Federal Reserve System since its establish- 
ment in 1914 has been to smooth the nominal interest rate. See, for example, Shiller (1980) and 
Miron (1986). 132  Hiroshi Yoshikawa 
Table 5.4  The Deterministic Seasonality of Monetary Aggregates 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Mean  S.D. 
(X  10)  (X  10)  (2)/(1)  S.E.  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May 
M2  + CD  0.10  0.13  1.30  0.06  -0.04 
(-3.43) 
money  (- 34.40) 
High-powered  0.09  0.70  7.78  0.18  -1.42 
Cash  0.09  0.75  8.33  0.14  -0.94 
Reserves  0.12  0.58  4.83  0.54  0.10 
(0.82) 
BOJ'slending  0.08  3.29  41.13  2.72  0.52 
(0.82) 
(-30.70)  I 
-0.07 
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Fig. 5.4  Spectrum of call rate 133  Monetary Policy and the Real Economy in Japan 
est rate at seasonal frequencies. This is a standard argument for seasonal nom- 
inal interest smoothing. 
In terms of the model in section 5.1, therefore,  the BOJ’s behavior at sea- 
sonal frequencies corresponds to d =  m. The call rate does not fluctuate much, 
but the money supply does. Then to what shocks does the money supply re- 
spond? First, it is also observed here that price movements do not show any 
significant seasonality (fig. 5.5). Output fluctuates, but price does not. Com- 
paring  equations (1  1) and (1  2) to (1  5) and (1  6), one can conclude that the 
marginal cost curve is fairly flat (y = m) and that price shocks are not signifi- 
cant (q = 0) at seasonal frequencies. As noted above, a comparison of  the 
seasonal cycles of production  and shipments also indicates that the marginal 
cost  curve is flat.  From equation (17), therefore, it becomes apparent  that 
seasonal changes in the money supply simply reflect portfolio shocks v (such 
as sharp increases in the demand for cash in December), and real  demand 
shocks u, one for one. There is little exogenous component (E)  in  money. 
Monetarism  both old and new, therefore, makes no sense in explaining sea- 
sonal cycles. 
Barsky and Miron (1989) obtain similar results for the U.S. economy and 
make the following argument. If it is accepted that the seasonal comovements 
of  money and output reflect the endogeneity of  money, does this allow one, 
by analogy, to draw any inference about similar high correlations  associated 
with the conventional  business  cycle? Application  of the principle of  parsi- 
mony suggests, they argue, that money is endogenous rather than causal with 
respect to the business cycle as well as the seasonal cycle. Of  course, one 
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ating the observed correlations over seasonal and business cycles. Nonethe- 
less, the similar comovement of money and output at the two sets of frequen- 
cies is at the very least suggestive of an endogenous money supply. 
5.3  Money Supply and the Business Cycle 
It was found that  in the  seasonal cycle the money  supply endogenously 
responds to portfolio and real demand shocks. This section examines the re- 
lation between money and output over the business cycle. 
A fairly high correlation between the money supply and GNP is observed 
over the business  cycle,  though it is not  as high  as in  the seasonal cycle. 
Monetarists  (Friedman  and  Schwartz  1963) contend  that  changes  in  the 
money supply have been “exogenous” and largely determined by autonomous 
policy decisions of the central bank. They also find that the velocity of money 
or the money demand function is stable, and accordingly argue that mmey is 
the causal factor in explaining economic activities. 
Economists such as Kaldor (1970) argue the story the other way round. The 
money supply “accommodates itself” to the needs of trade, rising in response 
to an expansion and vice versa, just as in a seasonal cycle. According to  their 
view, the relative stability in the demand for money is merely a reflection of 
the instability in its supply: if the supply of money had been kept more stable, 
the velocity  of  money  would  have been  more unstable.6 In  short, income 
causes endogenous changes in money. 
The issue has been  analyzed using  a causality  test (Granger  1969; Sims 
1972). Sims’s original finding that causality running from money to income 
cannot be’rejected was soon discovered to be not robust by Mehra (1978) and 
reconfirmed  by  Sims (1980).  Extending  the  original  bivariate  model  to  a 
model that included money, industrial production, WPI, and the short-term 
nominal interest rate, they found that the exogeneity of  money dramatically 
declines. Subsequent works (Bernanke 1986; Christian0 and Ljungvist 1988; 
Stock and Watson  1989) also show that the results of  the test are not quite 
robust with respect to such technical matters as the treatment of seasonality or 
the method used to make variables stationary. 
The causality test has been applied to Japanese data by a number of econo- 
mists. A typical result for the Japanese data (see, for example, Suzuki, Ku- 
roda,  and Shirakawa 1988) is that the call rate is exogenous, and causality 
runs from the call rate to money. In the second stage the causality runs from 
6. Kaldor (1970), for example, compares the U.S.  and Canadian experiences during the Gieat 
Depression (Friedman and Schwartz  1963, 352) as evidence for this argument. In Canada there 
were no bank failures at all during the Great Depression; the contraction in the money supply was 
much smaller than in the United States-only  two-fifths of that in the United States, or 13 against 
33%-yet  the contraction in nominal GNP was nearly the same. The difference in the change in 
the money supply was largely offset by differences in the decline in the velocity of money: in the 
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money to high-powered money and output. This result is taken by some BOJ 
officials  as  being  consistent  with  the  view  that  changes  in  high-powered 
money are the result rather than the cause of changes in more broadly defined 
monetary aggregates such as M,  + CD, and that the BOJ cannot control the 
money  supply by  simply controlling high-powered money.  In addition,  the 
finding of causality running from money to income is often taken as evidence 
in support of the monetarist view that the stability of the money supply nec- 
essarily contributes to the stability of output. 
Aside from a lack of robustness in the test with respect to the sample period 
or such technical matters mentioned above, the most serious problem of the 
causality test is that it can falsely indicate causality in certain cases. For ex- 
ample, suppose that stock prices are determined by the present value of future 
profits. If expectations of future profits embodied in the price of stock contain 
more information than is contained in the series of past profits, then the stock 
price would Granger-cause profits even though the truth is in fact the opposite. 
Yoshikawa (1989) provides  a model that produces spurious causality in the 
money-output relation.  Since the demand for loans depends on the future in- 
terest rate as well as on the current  interest rate, the quantity of  money de- 
pends on expectations of future output. One must,  therefore, be cautious in 
interpreting the results of causality tests. 
Given these considerations, how does one approach the money-output re- 
lationship in the business cycle? Our prior view is that the BOJ often smooths 
the nominal interest rate over the business cycle just as it does over the sea- 
sonal  cycle,  and  therefore  the  money  supply  is  endogenous  during  those 
interest-smoothing periods. There is an important difference between the two 
cycles, however. ,In the case of  the business cycle, the BOJ does not always 
smooth the nominal rate, and as a result the money supply often reflects ex- 
ogenous changes in the BOJ’s policy stance (nonzero E). The basic problem is 
that there is no simple feedback rule that governs the money supply, but rather 
one  that  involves  a  sh$  in  regime:  the  BOJ  often  accommodates  various 
shocks to smooth the nominal interest rate, but at other times it does not. This 
makes  it  extremely  difficult  to  productively  use  conventional  econometric 
methods including vector autoregressions  (VARs), which “flatten”  shifts  in 
regime and see only the averages. Still, it is desirable to identify the circum- 
stances under which the BOJ either smooths the nominal interest rate or ac- 
tively  changes the money  supply. As a first step, I have simply plotted  the 
data. By plotting monthly  data on money, output,  and the nominal  interest 
rate, we can at least identify when the BOJ smoothed the nominal rate, mak- 
ing changes in the money supply largely endogenous as in the seasonal cycle, 
and we can also determine what kinds of  shocks drove the money supply in 
each period. 
In figure 5.6, monthly rates of change in money, output, and inflation are 
plotted against the level of the nominal interest rate (only a few examples are 
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est rate are M,  + CD, IIP compiled by MITI, CPI inflation, and the call rate, 
respectively. To correct for seasonality, the rate of change of each variable is 
calculated relative to the same month of the previous year. 
Each figure corresponds to a pair of “easy” and “tight” money periods. The 
beginnings of “easy” and “tight” money periods are identified as the months 
in which the discount rate wasfirst either lowered or raised, respectively. This 
method of identifying the beginnings and ends of easy and tight money peri- 
ods is not altogether satisfactory but is used for convenience. With the help of 
figure 5.6 the chronology of Japanese monetary policy is traced for the thirty- 
year period from June 1958 to October 1990. This exercise is rather monoto- 
nous but essential for the subsequent argument. 
June through November 1958 (6 months): At the bottom of the recession, 
the discount rate was lowered in June  1958. During this period both output 
and money increased, and the interest rate declined. An easy monetary policy 
was actively pursued. The stable price level suggests that price shocks were 
absent and the marginal cost curve was flat (y = 00)  in this period. 
December  1958 through  November  1959 (12 months): Output increased 
while the interest rate was smoothed. The increase in money during this pe- 
riod mainly reflected output shocks. The stable price suggests the absence of 
price shocks and flat marginal costs. 
December through July  1960 (8 months): The discount rate was raised in 
December 1959. Output peaked and started to decline, while inflation began 
to accelerate. The BOJ continued to smooth the interest rate, which implies 
that the decrease in money during this period mainly reflected the decline in 
output. 
August 1960 though June 1961 (1 1 months): The discount rate was lowered 
in August  1960. Output continued to decline, albeit slightly. The interest rate 
was basically pegged: changes in money during this period therefore mainly 
reflected output shocks. 
July  1961 through  September  1962 (15 months): The discount  rate  was 
raised in July  1961. Money growth continued to fall during this period. The 
interest rate was raised,  although only slightly-from  8.4 to 8.8%. Output 
still declined. Inflation accelerated from June to December  1961 and started 
to decelerate in  May  1962. The decrease in money mainly reflected output 
and price shocks. 
October  1962 through  April  1963 (7 months): Output hit the trough  and 
started rising. Inflation sharply accelerated but still an easy monetary policy 
was actively pursued:  money  increased, and the interest rate  was lowered. 
(Note that the call rate in December 1962 is clearly abnormal, perhaps due to 
the BOJ’s failure to accommodate the seasonal increase in  the demand for 
money.) 
May through November 1963 (7 months): Output continued to climb while 
inflation  stayed  high.  The interest  rate  was  virtually  pegged.  Changes  in 
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December  1963 through June  1964 (7 months): Output stayed high while 
inflation  decreased. A  tight  monetary  policy  was  actively  pursued,  which 
drove the interest rate up. 
July through December  1964 (6 months): Output fell while inflation accel- 
erated. The interest rate was pegged.  The decrease in money during this pe- 
riod mainly reflected output and price shocks. 
January through October 1965 (10 months): The discount rate was lowered 
in January  1965. Output growth kept decelerated while inflation stayed high. 
The interest rate was sharply lowered. The increase in money during this pe- 
riod suggests that an easy monetary policy was actively pursued. 
November 1965 through May  1967 (19 months): Output kept rising while 
inflation kept decelerating.  The interest rate was pegged. Therefore, changes 
in money basically reflected output and price shocks. 
June 1967 through July 1968 (14 months): Output started to decrease while 
inflation accelerated. The money supply was actively lowered, raising the in- 
terest rate. 
August through December  1968 (5 months): Output kept decreasing while 
inflation also decelerated. The interest rate was actively lowered. 
January through June 1969 (6 months): Output began to increase while in- 
flation also accelerated. The interest rate was smoothed. 
July through September 1969 (3 months): Both output and inflation stayed 
high. The growth rate of the money supply was kept stable, allowing the in- 
terest rate to rise. In September the discount rate was also raised. 
October  1969 through September  1970 (12 months): The interest rate was 
basically  pegged.  During the first six months (October  1969 through March 
1970), output stayed high and inflation sharply accelerated. Afterward (April 
1970 through  September  1970), output  fell, and inflation  also decelerated. 
Changes  in  money  during this  period  basically  reflected  output  and  price 
shocks. 
October 1970 through July 1972 (22 months): During this period, the inter- 
est rate was  sharply  lowered  by  allowing the  money  supply to grow. Until 
January 1972 output fell, but it hit its trough at December 1971, and a recov- 
ery began. Inflation continued to decelerate. 
August through December  1972 (5 months): The interest rate was pegged. 
Output kept growing while inflation was stable at the 5% level. 
January  1973 through  October  1974 (22 months):  The interest rate  was 
sharply raised from below 5% to above 12% by reducing the money supply: 
inflation  accelerated from 6% (January  1973) to the unprecedented level of 
26% (February  1974) and finally started to decelerate (October 1974). Output 
stayed high for most  of  1973, then  sharply declined from  14% (November 
1973) to -  11% (October 1974). 
November 1974 through March  1975 (5 months): The interest rate was ba- 
sically pegged. Inflation kept decelerating from 25% to 14%. Output also de- 
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April  1975 through January  1976 (10 months): The interest rate was ac- 
tively lowered by increasing the money supply. During this period inflation 
decelerated  from  13% to 9%, while output was steadily rising from -  14% 
to 6%. 
February  1976 through February  1977 (13 months): The interest rate was 
basically  pegged.  Output stayed high  at the level of  12% and then  started 
decelerating  in  November  1976,  while  inflation  also  stayed  high  at  9%. 
Changes in the money supply reflected output shocks. 
March  1977 through March  1978 (13 months): The interest rate was ac- 
tively lowered  from  7% to 4.5%. Output continued  to fall, while inflation 
started decelerating from 9.5% to 5%. 
April  1978 through March  1979 (12 months): The interest rate was basi- 
cally pegged.  During this period, output  stayed high at 7% while  inflation 
continued to decelerate from 5% to below 3%. 
April  1979 through July  1980 (16 months): The interest rate was actively 
raised from 5% to  12.5% by  reducing the money supply. Output was fairly 
stable around 10% and started to decelerate in April 1980. On the other hand, 
inflation was stable during the first six months of this period, then accelerated 
from 4% (October  1979) to 7.5% (February  1980) and stayed at that level 
afterward. 
August 1980 through April 1981 (9 months): The interest rate was actively 
lowered from 12% to 5% by increasing the money supply. Output continued 
to decline below zero while inflation decelerated from 8% to 5%. 
May 1981 through December 1985 (56 months): The interest rate was kept 
stable at around 6-7%.  Output first recovered from  -4%  (May 1981) to 5% 
(November 1981) but then declined from 5% (November 1981) to  -5%  (Oc- 
tober 1982). Afterward (November 1982 through October 1984) it rose from 
-  5% to 12% and declined again from 10% (October 1984) to zero (December 
1985). In the same period, inflation continued to decline from 5% (May 1981) 
to  2%  (November  1982) and  remained  at  about  that  level afterward. The 
growth of the money supply changed irregularly, reflecting output and price 
shocks. 
January  1986 through  April  1987 (16 months): The interest rate was ac- 
tively lowered. The yen sharply appreciated in real terms after the Plaza Ac- 
cord in September 1985, and the subsequent decline in exports caused a reces- 
sion in 1986. Output growth continued to decline below zero. The bottom of 
this recession occurred in December  1986. Inflation declined, due partly to 
the sharp appreciation of the yen. 
May 1987 through March 1989 (23 months): The interest rate was basically 
pegged  at  3%. Output growth recovered  from -  1%  (May  1987) to  11% 
(March 1988) and stayed high afterward. Throughout this period inflation was 
very stable. Changes in  the money supply therefore mainly reflected output 
shocks. 
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tively raised. Output growth declined from 7% (May  1989) to zero (March 
1990) but recovered to 8% (October  1990) again. Inflation was stable at 3% 
during this period. 
These findings are summarized as follows. 
First of all, in  195 out of 389 months in the sample period from June 1958 
to October 1990, the interest rate was either pegged or tightly smoothed. Dur- 
ing  those  periods  in  which  the  interest  rate  was  substantially  smoothed, 
money, output, and inflation all widely fluctuated. It is very unlikely that real 
output  and  inflation  respond  within  a  month  to exogenous  changes  in  the 
money supply in such a way as to keep the interest rate unchanged.  In con- 
trast, it is known from the study of the seasonal cycle that the BOJ can accom- 
modate output, price, and portfolio  shocks to wipe out monthly movements 
in  the  interest rate. The conclusion, therefore,  is that  in  about half  of  the 
thirty-year period, changes in the money supply were endogenous and simply 
reflected output, inflation and/or portfolio shocks just as it does over the sea- 
sonal cycle. This fact alone implies that monetarism,  both  new and old, is 
very  misleading  in  interpreting  the  observed changes  in  money supply and 
therefore in explaining the business cycle. 
This fact also means that monetary models that emphasize nominal rigidi- 
ties due to temporary  wage and price stickiness (Taylor 1989; Fischer  1977) 
are likewise untenable to the extent that they take exogenous money supply 
shocks to be the major impulses behind economic fluctuations. The literature 
on monetary  models  with  nominal rigidities,  however,  which is sometimes 
referred to as “Keynesian,” flourishes. In theory, attempts to explain nominal 
price rigidities are clearly motivated  by the  premise that exogenous money 
supply shocks are the major disturbances to the economy.  Empirical works 
also abound. Blanchard and Quah (1989), for example, assume the existence 
of  a “demand shock” that has no permanent effect on real variables in their 
VAR analysis. They use this assumption as an identifying restriction and then 
interpret “demand shocks” as money supply innovations. Taylor (1989) also 
assumes that money supply shocks are the major disturbances in the economy, 
and he emphasizes differences in price/wage flexibility (specifically, the syn- 
chronized wage setting known as Shunto) as the key factor in explaining the 
difference in output variability  between Japan and the United States. He ar- 
gues that, thanks to the Shunto, nominal wages  are much more flexible  in 
Japan  than  in  the  United  States, and therefore  that  nominal  money  supply 
shocks do not translate into real shocks, thereby making real output in Japan 
more stable than is the case in the United States. 
A brief review of the postwar record of monetary policy in Japan reveals, 
however, that the interest rate was very often (half the period) either pegged 
or substantially  smoothed, suggesting  therefore  that money  supply innova- 
tions during those periods simply reflect output, price, and portfolio shocks. 
The fact that changes in output fluctuate considerably during periods of inter- 
est smoothing suggests the importance of real shocks in explaining the busi- 142  Hiroshi Yoshikawa 
ness  cycle. Whether  these real  shocks are the  supply  (productivity)  shocks 
emphasized  by  the real  business  cycle theorists  or the real  demand  shocks 
emphasized by the Keynesians  is, of course, another issue.  Yoshikawa and 
Ohtake (1987) argue that for the postwar business cycle in Japan, real demand 
shocks were the major disturbance. 
The BOJ’s ability to peg or smooth the interest rate from month to month 
over the business cycle as well as the seasonal cycle necessarily  implies that 
changes in the interest rate reflect the BOJ’s policy stance. This is the case 
whether the  BOJ  actively changes the  interest  rate  in the  absence of  other 
shocks or allows the interest rate to change when the shocks do not originate 
in the actions of the BOJ. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) also attempt to show 
that  changes  in  the  federal  funds rate  reflect  the  Federal  Reserve’s policy 
stance, by estimating the interest elasticity of the reserve supply function. The 
point of their estimation is to find a proper instrument to identify the supply 
function.  I  make a similar argument by showing that the call rate was very 
often pegged or tightly smoothed from month to month by the BOJ. 
When  the  interest  rate  changes consistently  and  substantially  between 
months,  it reflects the BOJ’s policy stance.  In this sample, in 96 out of  389 
months,  the  interest rate was raised, whereas it was lowered  in 98 months. 
The question  is  whether there  is any systematic  feedback  rule guiding the 
BOJ’s choice either to smooth or to change the interest rate.  Since the data 
contain many zeros or close to zero values for the rate of change of the interest 
rate,  one would  have to resort  to an estimation  method involving probit to 
take into account a regime shift in monetary policy. In what follows, however, 
as a preliminary exercise a VAR  is used simply to explore the policy reaction 
function’of the BOJ. 
For the United States, Papell (1989) argues that a rule that stabilizes the rate 
of  growth of nominal GNP provides a good description of monetary policy 
since 1973. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) also estimate a VAR  with three var- 
iables and show that the federal funds rate responds positively to an inflation 
shock  and  negatively  to  an  unemployment  shock  (during  the  pre-October 
1979 period).  This result  is  broadly  consistent  with  Papell  (1989).  In  the 
United States, monetary policy appears to have been conducted as a standard 
stabilization policy.’ 
In Japan the case is not  as simple.  A previous  review of the records,  for 
example, shows that in the period from October 1962 to April 1963, the inter- 
est rate was successively lowered while output was rising  and inflation was 
rapidly accelerating to 9%. During this period (particularly  March and April 
1963), the BOJ explicitly stated that the purpose of the reduction of the dis- 
count rate was not stabilization, but rather to strengthen the international com- 
7. Examination of Federal Reserve records (Romer and Romer 1989) also confirms that during 
the postwar era the Federal Reserve appears to have made deliberate decisions to sacrifice real 
output to lower inflation (in October 1947, September 1955, December 1968, April 1974, August 
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petitiveness of Japanese industry by encouraging investment (BOJ 1986). An- 
ticipating the liberalization of capital import regulations in April  1964 when 
Japan became a member of OECD, policymakers  as well as business people 
in those days regarded international competitiveness  as one of the most im- 
portant policy targets. 
In the 1980s the interest rate was substantially lowered between December 
1985 and May  1986. Although  1986 was a recession  year, it is widely  be- 
lieved that these reductions in the interest rate were aimed mainly at assisting 
the smooth appreciation of the yen, which the G5 countries agreed upon at the 
Plaza in September  1985. These examples and my previous discussion both 
suggest that the BOJ’s policy objective is not  simply stabilized output, but 
rather multivalued. 
Within  the confines of  stabilization,  the nominal  interest  rate  smoothing 
often pursued by the BOJ complicates matters. Consider for example the fol- 
lowing feedback rule: 
(23)  M, = -aY, -  pp, + E,. 
If the authority attempts to stabilize Y and t  we would expect CY  and p in (23) 
to be positive. As mentioned above, this seems to be the kind of rule that the 
Federal Reserve pursues. When the BOJ smooths the interest rate, however, (Y 
and p are negative in (23).  Since the BOJ does in fact attempt to stabilize the 
interest rate at times, even the signs of  (Y and p are time-varying in the BOJ’s 
policy reaction function. 
How can we characterize the BOJ’s policy reaction governing nominal in- 
terest rate smoothing? To answer this question, I confine the discussion to real 
output  K  Let the “natural ,” “potential,” “non-inflation-accelerating,” or “full- 
employment” output be denoted by y*.  The BOJ seems to pursue the follow- 
ing rules: raise the interest rate if Y, > YT  -  E; smooth or peg the interest rate 
if YF  -  E 2 Y,  2 Y:  -  6; lower the interest rate if YT  -  6 > Y,  (6 >  E > 0). 
The important point is that YT  cannot be found by mechanical methods such 
as estimating a time trend. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
one of the major tasks of the BOJ is to grasp current Y* as soon and as accu- 
rately  as possible.  No monetary  authority would  attempt to curb economic 
growth simply because output exceeded its trend line. Rather, growth would 
be always welcomed and accommodated, just as are seasonal cycles, provided 
that it did not fuel inflation or conflict with other important policy objectives 
such as exchange rate or balance of  payment  targets.  The point  is that  Y? 
cannot be measured accurately enough using past data to make it feasible for 
monetary  policy  to be described  as a stable, time-invariant  feedback  rule. 
Given this caveat, I will nevertheless check the response functions of the call 
rate based on VARs. 
For this purpose, I first estimated a four-variable VAR with the call rate, the 
rate of change in IIP, CPI inflation, and a net export variable. The last variable 
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period is July  1958 through November 1990, but I also estimated VARs for 
two subsample periods: July 1958 through December 1972 and January 1973 
through November 1990. In table 5.5 the impulse response functions of  the 
call rate to shocks to other variables are shown (see column 1). 
The results look like plausible response functions. Output shocks drive up 
the call rate, with the peak effect coming after fifteen months and then decay- 
ing very slowly. Inflation shocks also drive up the call rate in a very similar 
fashion for the January  1973 through November 1990 period, but push it in 
the opposite direction for the July 1958 through December 1972 period. Judg- 
ing from this result, we can conclude that the anti-inflation stance of the BOJ 
was much stronger in the post-oil shock period than in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Finally, for the entire period the call rate responds negatively to an increase in 
the trade balance. The response of the call rate to net export shocks is more 
substantial than its response to output and inflation shocks, and the peak effect 
comes after twenty months. In Japan the trade balance or current account has 
always been one of the main targets of monetary policy. Put differently, Ja- 
pan’s “potential” output has been effectively constrained by the supply of raw 
materials, which constitute the bulk of Japan’s imports. 
Irrespective of its objectives, when the BOJ changes its policy stance, how 
does this affect the economy? Table 5.5 shows that innovations in the call rate 
very strongly drive down output, with the peak effect coming after twelve to 
fifteen months. Since it has already been observed that innovations in the call 
rate mainly reflect changes in the BOJ’s policy stance, one can conclude that 
monetary policy does affect real output.8 Accordingly, it is possible to reject 
the real business cycle theorist’s view, which holds that money is always noth- 
ing but a+mirror  image of real shocks and plays no role in the business cycle 
(King and  Plosser  1984; Plosser  1990). This point can also be confirmed, 
though more casually, just by  looking at figure 5.6. Inflation also negatively 
responds to call rate shocks, but its response is much weaker than the response 
of output, and the lags are longer. 
By focusing on the periods of interest rate smoothing, I have argued that 
real shocks are important in  the business cycle. When the BOJ changes its 
policy stance, however, it also affects the real economy. 
5.4  The Ransmission of Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy affects the real economy. What is the transmission mecha- 
nism of  monetary policy? As a preliminary  step to answering this question, 
table  5.6 summarizes,  for the postwar business  cycle,  the extent to which 
8. Romer and Romer (1989) put a dummy variable (which identifies the six months when the 
Federal Reserve made the decision to seek to induce a recession in order to reduce inflation) into 
the univariate autoregressive equation for industrial production. They found that this dummy var- 
iable has a significantly negative effect on industrial production. The dummy variable constructed 
from Federal Reserve records, however, does not indicate the length of the shocks caused by the 
Fed, nor does it differentiate the shocks by size. I believe that changes in the call rate identify the 
timing and size of changes in the BOJ’s policy stance. 145  Monetary Policy and the Real Economy in Japan 
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-  ,164786E-01 
-  ,523441E-01 
-  ,843619E-01 
-  . I13807 
-  .I40072 
-  ,162467 
-  .I81221 
-  ,196503 
-  ,208267 
-  ,216755 
-  ,222275 
-  .404968 
-  ,361983 
-  ,325161 
-  ,316685 
-  ,273859 
-  .275887 
-  ,252514 
-  ,225727 
-  ,203541 
-  ,174542 
-  .I52298 
-  ,129983 
-  .I07660 
-  .891609E-01 
-  .711475E-01 
-  ,549967E-01 
-  .4  I65 I3E-0  1 
-  ,297332E-01 
-  ,197923E-0  1 
-  .I  18207E-01 
-  .535052E-02 
-  ,460963E-03 
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-  .485095E-01 
.569025E-O  1 
-  ,174424 
,27681 1E-01 
.27  182  IE-03 
-  .I10917 
-.I15514 
-  .849986E-01 
-.122911 
-  ,123965 
-  ,146173 
-  .I 14822 
-  ,140559 
-  ,146584 
-  ,122549 
-  ,139172 
-  .I31411 
-  ,122894 
-  ,123838 
-  .I  16448 
-  .I 10994 
-  .I05699 
-  .995787E3-01 
-  .937104E-01 
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-  .371428 
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-  ,128907 
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-  ,187376 
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-  .207829 
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-  .36  1767E-0  1 
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-  ,378897E-01 
-  ,300621E-01 
-  .259016E-01 
-  ,195882E-01 
-  .137695E-O1 
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-  .348843E-02 
-  ,37744  I E-03 
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.8  193968-02 
-  ,134834 
-  .857447E-01 
-  ,439390E-03 
-  .  I37799 
-  ,119309 
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-  ,130615 
-  ,143366 
-  ,138143 
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-  ,130465 
-  ,127861 
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-  .703329E-01 
-  .828531E-01 
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~  ,446885E-01 
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-  .398661E-02 
,1547  12E-02 
.48 1747E-02 
.9800 13E-03 
-  .157717E-O2 
-  .5,70577E-02 
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-  .205402E-01 
-  .284744E-01 
-  .372512E-01 
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-  .533962E-01 
-  .608669E-01 
.oooooo 
-  ,497889E-01 
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.oooooo 
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-  .321000 
-.  I5  1552E-01 
-  ,5176898-02 





























.976385E-O  1 
.oooooo 
.396278E-01 
-  .204372E-01 
-  . I9445 IE-01 
-  .320531E-01 
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-  ,530313E-01 
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-  ,751015 
-  ,833962 
-  ,781982 
-  ,808896 
-  ,775428 
-  ,704136 
-  ,659767 
-  .557412 
-  ,457188 
-  .359419 
-  .245657 
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-  .770748E-01 
-  .  I34020 
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-  .237836 
-  ,284997 
-  .329287 
-  ,370063 
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-  .260953 
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-  1 ,34649 
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-  1.22232 
-  1.15732 
-  1.08407 
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.20  19 18E-01 
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,990  174E-0  I 
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.83  1050E-01 
.73  13348-01 
,683073E-01 
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.7  350588-01 
.68  l586E-0 1 
.654898E-01 
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-  ,363744 
-  ,138283 
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-  ,282032 
-  ,304969 
-  ,142415 
-  ,358269 
-  ,296260 
~  ,224240 
-  .289692 
-  ,234901 
-  .225515 
-  .243400 
-  ,238564 
-  .225739 
-  ,226662 
-  ,225056 
-  .220878 
-  ,223167 
-  ,224709 
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-  ,230280 
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-  ,292984 
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-.381175 
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-  ,485212 
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-.516911 
-  .524176 
-  ,526417 
-  ,524594 
-  ,518447 
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,3465  18 
different  demand  components  have  accounted  for  different  shares  of  the 
change in GNP. 
Since the Japanese economy has been growing rapidly, almost all variables 
increase in absolute terms even in recessions.  I therefore first calculated the 
change in each variable measured from trough to peak in case of a recovery, 
and from peak to trough in case of  a growth recession.  I then subtracted the 
latter from the former to obtain the difference. Table 5.6 reports the relative 
contribution of each demand component, for each postwar cycle, to this cycli- 
cal difference in the change in real GNP. Friedman (1990) presents a similar 
but slightly different table for postwar U.S. recessions. For the sake of  com- 
parison, I present results for the United States based on the method described 
above (table 5.7). 
In Japan throughout the whole period, the relative contribution of  fixed in- 
vestment has been the greatest of all the demand components: 60% of GNP on 
average. In contrast, in the United States fixed investment accounts for only 
25% on average of  the change in real GNP. The relative contribution of  inven- 
tory  and housing  investments  is greater in the United  States than  in Japan. 
Changes in housing  investment  in Japan are not  really  systematic over the 
business cycle. On the other hand, until the mid-1960s, inventory investment 
had  a large  impact on Japanese business  cycle:  a 60-70%  contribution.  A 
substantial portion of the inventory investment was, however, raw materials- 
which were also imports. Therefore, the contribution of inventory investment 
and imports almost canceled each other. As a result, fixed investment retained Table 5.6  The Relative Contribution of Demand Components to the Business Cycle, Japan 
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CD  LND 
8.8?14  81.8256 
15.4472  22.3729 
44.6072  29.9255 
14.0854  -5.0986 
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NEX  EX  IM  G 
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-45.338 
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-  77.34 
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-  80.357 
-  16.525 
-23.013 
Average % 
18.0807  35.8718  -  24.065  27.780  -51.845  -  11.598 Table 5.7  The Relative Contribution of Demand Components to the Business Cycle, United States 
Peak  Trough  Peak  GNP  I1  D  IH  IF  C 
% 
~~~  ~ 
5703  5801  600  1  100  34.0739  65.926  1  8.5508  17.0499  27.1248 
6001  6004  6903  100  52.5561  47.4439  15.7570  15.9706  33.2836 
6903  7002  7304  100  28.2595  71.7405  24.4541  21.9450  13.9530 
7304  7501  8001  100  31.5844  68.4156  21.5106  25.41  3 1  35.2068 
8001  8002  8103  100  8.6601  91.3399  3 1.0866  31.4134  53.901 1 
8103  8203  9003  100  19.7589  80.241 1  13.2042  27.2770  25.5607 
Average % 
100  24.2747  75.7253  20.7552  25.1305  35.4643 
~~ 
Peak  Trough 
5703  5801 
600  I  6004 
6903  7002 
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800  1  8002 
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Peak 






CD  CND  NEX  EX  1M  G 
7.7241  19.4007  15.397  15.9907  -0.465  -2.2991 
7.8344  25.4492  -  18.225  0.5729  -  18.679  0.6577 
1 1.9637  1.9893  -  7.534  4.5817  -  12.116  18.9436 
13.8456  21.3612  -  12.426  10.7646  -23.191  -  1.2044 
34.1299  19.7712  -  18.791  5.5147  -24.306  -6.4134 
10.8982  14.6625  9.814  27.3771  -  17.463  4.2434 
Average % 
17.8298  17.6345  -  6.059  1 1.4677  -  17.496  0.36471 154  Hiroshi Yoshikawa 
its importance. As a long-term trend, the role of inventory investment in the 
business cycle seems to have diminished in both Japan and the United States. 
Net exports have been countercyclical in Japan’s business cycle except for 
the years  1977-85,  in which economic growth was export-led. In particular, 
imports have been very countercyclical: the fraction of  output was -  52% on 
average, compared to -  17% in the United  States. Until  very  recently, the 
bulk of Japanese imports consisted of raw materials and therefore moved very 
mechanically in parallel with the level of aggregate economic activity. 
The contribution of  consumption to GNP seems to be in large part similar 
in the two countries, although the contribution of nondurables is substantially 
higher in Japan. As for government expenditures, we find them countercycli- 
cal for Japan (- 12% of GNP on average) but neutral (0.4%) for the United 
States. 
In sum, the major differences between Japan and the United States lie in the 
facts that fixed investment  plays a much larger role in the business cycle in 
Japan than in the United States, and that net exports and government expend- 
itures are much more countercyclical in Japan. These findings help us identify 
the important components in the Japanese business cycle. Yet it remains to be 
seen how they are related to monetary policy. To  see these relations,  I ran a 
set of bivariate VARs using the call rate and each component of expenditures. 
(All the variables except for inventory investment are log differenced. Inven- 
tory investment is differenced.) One can see from figures 5.7-5.12  that invest- 
ment and imports are the components that respond substantially to innovations 
in the call rate. There are lags of  two to three quarters before changes in the 
call rate have an impact on these variables. 
Summing up the findings in this section, I conclude that monetary policy, 
represented by changes in the call rate, exerts substantial effects on real output 
in Japan mainly through its effect on fixed investment and imports. Since im- 
ports were almost identical to inventory investment in the 1950s and  1960s, 
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one can also say that inventory investment was a major channel of monetary 
policy in those days. 
5.5  Conclusion 
Economists often assume an exogenous money supply in both theoretical 
and empirical works.  In this chapter, I show that this assumption is highly 
misleading. Over the seasonal cycle, changes in the money supply are actually 
nothing but mirror images of the changes in real output and/or portfolio pref- 
erences. This is because the BOJ either pegs or smooths the nominal interest 
rate. The same observation also applies to the business cycle as well-even  in 
the 1980s-and  leads us to reject an array of monetary models of the business 157  Monetary Policy and the Real Economy in Japan 
cycle such as monetarism both new and old, and monetary models with nom- 
inal rigidities.  To the extent that the money supply responds endogenously to 
real output through interest rate smoothing, it is not at all surprising that nom- 
inal money and real output are highly  correlated.  From this viewpoint,  we 
find that the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated changes in the 
money supply (Barro 1977) is not very important. 
There is an important difference between the seasonal cycle and business 
cycles, however. The BOJ does not always accommodate output, price,  and 
portfolio shocks, instead allowing the interest rate to change, and at times it 
even actively changes the interest  rate during the business cycle (“dynamic 
operations”). The BOJ’s policy response function therefore involves a kind of 
regime shift between interest smoothing and dynamic operations. My simple 
VAR  analysis suggests, however,  that the trade balance has always been the 
main  target  of  monetary  policy.  In  the  1950s and  1960s, the  anti-inflation 
stance of the BOJ seems to have been much weaker than during the post41 
shock period. 
When the BOJ changes its policy stance, moreover,  it affects real output. 
Accordingly, I reject the real business cycle theorist’s view, which holds that 
money shocks are always nothing but the mirror image of real shocks and that 
money  therefore  plays  no  role  in  the  business  cycle.  The  analysis  in 
section  5.4 suggests that  monetary policy  has  substantial  impacts on  real 
output, mainly through fixed investment and imports in Japan. One remain- 
ing task is to pin down the impact of changes in the interest rate on fixed in- 
vestment.  It is well known that the interest elasticity of  investment is typi- 
cally estimated to be  small or even insignificant.  One possible  explanation 
to this puzzle  is that  monetary  policy  directly affects output  through  work- 
ing capital, but at the same time investment varies through changes in anti- 
cipations of future sales rather than financial costs. This problem awaits fur- 
ther investigation. 
References 
Bank of Japan. 1986. A Centennial History of the Bank of Japan. Tokyo. 
Barro, R. 1977. Unanticipated money growth and unemployment in the United States. 
American Economic Review, March. 
Barsky, R., and J. Miron. 1989. The seasonal cycle and the business cycle. Journal of 
Political Economy, June. 
Bernanke, B. 1986. Alternative explanations of the money-income correlation. Jour- 
nal  of  Monetary  Economics,  supplement  (Carnegie-Rochester Conference  Se- 
ries 25). 
Bernanke, B., and A. Blinder.  1992. The federal funds rate and the channels of mon- 
etary transmission.  American Economic Review, September. 
Blanchard, O.,  and D. Quah.  1989. The dynamic effects of  aggregate demand  and 
supply disturbances. American Economic Review, September. 158  Hiroshi Yoshikawa 
Christiano, L., and L. Ljungqvist.  1988. Money does Granger-cause output in the 
bivariate money-output relation. Journal of  Monetary Economics 22. 
Fischer, S. 1977. Long-term contracts, rational expectations, and the optimal money 
supply rule. Journal of  Political Economy, February. 
Friedman, B.  1990. Changing effects of  monetary policy on real economic activity. 
NBER Working Paper No. 3278. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, March. 
Friedman, M. 1968. The role of monetary policy. American Economic Review, March. 
Friedman, M., and A. Schwartz. 1963. Monetary and business cycles. Review of  Eco- 
Granger,  C. W.  J.  1969. Investigating  causal relations by  econometric  models and 
Kaldor, N. 1970. The new monetarism. Lloyds BankReview, July. 
King, R., and C. Plosser.  1984. Money, credit, and prices in a real business cycle. 
American Economic Review, June. 
Lucas, R. 1972. Expectation and the neutrality of money. Journal of  Economic Theory, 
April. 
. 1977. Understanding business cycles. Journal of  Monetary Economics, Sup- 
plement. 
McCallum, B. T. 1983. A reconsideration of  Sim’s evidence concerning monetarism. 
The Economics Letters 13: 167-7  1. 
Mehra, Y.  1978. Is money exogenous in money-demand equations? Journal of  Politi- 
cal Economy, April. 
Miron, J.  1986. Financial panics, the seasonality of the nominal interest rate, and the 
founding of the Fed. American Economic Review, March. 
Papell, D. 1989. Monetary policy in the United States under flexible exchange rates. 
American Economic Review, December. 
Plosser, C.  1990. Money and business cycles: A real business cycle interpretation. 
NBER Working Paper No. 3221. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Review, January. 
Romer, C.’, and D. Romer. 1989. Does monetary policy matter? A new test in the spirit 
of  Friedman and Schwartz. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, ed. 0.  Blan- 
chard and S. Fischer. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Roosa, R.  1956. Federal Reserve Operations in the Money and Government Securities 
Market. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, July. 
Shiller, R. 1980. Can the Fed control real interest rates? In Rational Expectations and 
Economic Policy, ed. S. Fischer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Sims, C. 1972. Money, income, and causality. American Economic Review, Septem- 
ber. 
. 1980. Comparison of  interwar and postwar business cycles: Monetarism re- 
considered. American Economic Review, May. 
Stock, J. H., and M. W.  Watson.  1989. Interpreting the evidence of  money-income 
causality. Journal of  Econometrics 40. 
Suzuki,  Y., A. Kuroda, and H. Shirakawa.  1988. Monetary control mechanism in 
Japan. Bank of  Japan Monetary and Economics Studies, no. 2:43-65. 
Taylor, J. B.  1979. Estimation and control of a macroeconomic model with rational 
expectations. Econometrica, September. 
. 1980. Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts. Journal of  Political Econ- 
omy, February. 
. 1989. Differences in economic fluctuations in Japan and the United States: 
The role of  nominal rigidities.  Journal of  the Japanese and International Econo- 
mies. 
nomics and Statistics, February. 
cross-spectral methods. Econometrica, July. 159  Monetary Policy and the Real Economy in Japan 
Yoshikawa, H.  1989. Money supply and the real economy (in Japanese). Keizaigaku 
Ronshu 55, no. 3:31-57. 
Yoshikawa, H., and F.  Ohtake.  1987. Postwar business cycles in Japan: A quest for 
the right explanation. Journal of  the Japanese  and International  Economies,  De- 
cember. 